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Abstract
The present article concentrates on understanding the limits of language
from the realm of meaning theory as portrayed by Wittgenstein. In the
Tractatus, Wittgenstein’s picture theory provides a glimpse of reality by
indicating that a picture could be true or false from the perspective of
reality. He talks about an internal limitation of language rather than an
external limitation of language. In Wittgenstein’s later works like
Philosophical Investigations, the concept of picture theory has faded
away, and he deeply becomes more interested in the ‘use theory of
meaning’ and ‘language game.’ My other attempt in this paper is to
show Husserl’s theory of meaning and try to find out its compatibility
with Wittgenstein’s thoughts. Husserl thinks that as a part of
phenomenological experience, ‘meaning’ should be an act character that
Wittgenstein rejected as an appeal of inner experience. Like Mohanty, I
also attempt to show the Husserlian idea of meaning as an essence that
is related to the meaning rather than linguistics. Both the giants are
talking about description of language from different levels. My effort
would be to illustrate how these two giant thinkers proclaim their meaning
theories in such a way that leads to a well-known internalism versus
externalism debate in the philosophy of mind and language.
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Introduction
Though a clue of negative remark about ‘theory of meaning’ we will find in
Wittgenstein’s later writing, where he claims that “The mistake is to say that there is
anything that meaning something consists in” (Zettel 16), yet in both periods (Tractatus
and Philosophical Investigations) his primary aim is to understand the limits of
language in terms of the theory of meaning. We can say that he has an intention to
provide a new foundation of meaning. In the period of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein
believes that a name having ‘meaning’ depends on its being co-related to an object.
A sentence is a combination of names, and the meaning of a sentence is determined
by the meaning of its constituents. Wittgenstein admits that the meaning of a sentence
does not depend on its truth-value. My attempt would be to revisit the position of
Husserl’s meaning theory at the end of the paper. Let us first focus on Wittgenstein
and his diversified approaches on meaning.
Tractatus and the Picture Theory of meaning
Tractatus is painting a picture of our language for its clarification. This model
helps us to understand that “A proposition is a picture of reality; for if I understand a
proposition, I know the situation that it represents” (Tractatus 4.021). He also believes
that the totality of proposition is language. Then one may argue, “Is there any
constitutive feature by which a picture denotes its picturesque”? Wittgenstein answers
that the pictorial form is the possibility of a relationship between the elements of the
picture because it is considered as a common element of pictures. This is the process
how a picture seems attach to the reality. A picture is actually a fact, and then we
assume that the picture is a fact composed of the elements. Wittgenstein believes
that only facts can express sense, but a set of names cannot. Therefore, Wittgenstein
concludes, “What a picture represents is its sense” (Tractatus 2.221). Each picture
has some fundamental features:
a. In a picture, the elements of the picture are actually representatives
of objects.
b. What constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another
in a determinate way.
c. A picture should be attached to its reality.
d. Every element of a picture has a corresponding identical element to
pictorial form.
e. Every picture has two pure forms – one is logical form and other
pictorial form. The relation between picture and pictorial form will be
non-arbitrary and co-related.
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f. Wittgenstein thinks that a picture may be true or false from the
perspective of reality. There are no pictures that are a priori true.
(Tractatus 2.225)
P.M.S. Hacker aptly mentions, “As we have seen, the picture theory is what it
purports to be – a theory of propositional representation. It is intended as a quite
general theory which will provide an analysis of any type of proposition” (127-128).
Wittgenstein believes that a picture can both say and show; they show their sense by
the circumstance that “What would be the case if things were true” (Tractatus 2.221)
and say that the state of affairs they claim to represent is the case (Tractatus 4.022).
The state of affairs may be existence or non-existence of facts. However, we cannot
think illogical ways. The logical form of picture theory has three fundamental issues
– language, thought and reality. Early Wittgenstein’s philosophy seems close to the
representationalist view and his semantic is well known as the logical semantic. Some
interpreters mainly Jaakko Hintikka has a tendency to claim that “Hence all matters
of logical form belong to the sphere of what can only be shown, not said, because of
the ineffability of all semantics” (8).
Hintikka’s Claims
Language is the best medium to understand the world. Language has some
limits. If we consider explaining the logic of language in regards to the “Truth functional
Structure,” then we will find that there are two different conceptions of logic, ‘logic
as calculus’ and ‘logic as language.’ Hintikka aims to put language as a universal
medium. The doctrine of ‘limit of language’ has an intimate relation to his belief
‘Language as the universal medium.’ Hintikka claims, “For Wittgenstein, the most
important ‘limit of language’ therefore was, not the external (as it were) boundary of
language, but the internal limitation of language, viz., the inevitable restrictions on
what one can say in language about that language” (17).. Wittgenstein also thinks that
the meaning of a symbol is involved in calculation. Hintikka considers that in Tractatus
we may find “ineffability of semantics.” Logical form of semantics can be shown but
not said. Wittgenstein believes that one can resolve the indispensable nature of language
to any concrete language by analysing it into an elementary proposition. The conception
of the elementary proposition in a language instigates the idea of logical formula that
deals with the limit of language. As we know, the slogan of the Tractatus is ‘The
limits of my language mean the limits of my world’ (Tractatus 5.6). This is the
Wittgensteinian way to insinuate the world in the “clothed of language” (28), as once
Ayer mentioned.  The concern is not to see whether Wittgenstein’s approach to ‘my
world’ goes to astray (in the sense of solipsism) or not. Here one can concern about
the substantial necessary truth that may construct the idea of reality from the
background of language. Its progeny reminds Wittgenstein’s contemplation that the
proposition does not stretch out inside the limit of language (i.e. a factual discourse),
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so it cannot be asserted, but the proposition can be showable in logical structure. The
philosophical propositions are neither based on factuality nor contingency. They have
some ambiguous sense in the case of expressions. Hintikka, who might have been
impressed by the Chomskyan idea of ‘syntactic structures,’ where syntaxes are in
the brain, while semantic locates in language and the world. Wittgenstein appeals in
Tractatus that the elementary propositions are logically independent of each other, as
its truth-value never entails from one another. A logical necessity in Wittgenstein’s
sense is based on the essential nature of the proposition. If there is a thought that one
can grasp without expressing it seems ‘substantial nonsense’ in Wittgenstein’s outlook.
Here the logical structure of language itself averts the elementary proposition to
articulate thought in a sayable mode.
Meaning Theory and Philosophical Investigations
Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning takes a radical change in his later writing,
especially in the Philosophical Investigations. Here an investigation of meaning
gives more importance to how speakers learn to use the expression. So we may call
it semantics with a ‘primitive learning theory.’ In Philosophical Investigations, the
meaning plays the central theme. Wittgenstein thinks that the meaning correlates to
understanding and similarly understanding relies on the explanation. In his last book
the Zettel, Wittgenstein remarks, “I am making a connection between the concept of
teaching and the concept of meaning” (412). One may ask, “What is taught in
language”? The answer will be the language teaching is not only training but also a
concept of meaning as use. However, in Philosophical Grammar, Wittgenstein
cautions, “Let’s only bother about what’s called the explanation of meaning, and let’s
not bother about meaning in any other sense” (68-69). For this reason, in the
Philosophical Investigations, the conception of ‘picture theory’ has faded away.
The picture theory is basically based on the logical forms, but later Wittgenstein is
interested deeply in the language. Therefore, we may consider the “language game”
as universal from the perspective of limit of language.
The idea of “language game” is first introduced in the Blue Book, which is
regarded as preliminary studies for the Philosophical Investigations. In that book
Wittgenstein writes, “Language-games are the forms of language with which a child
begins to make use of words. The study of language-games is the study of primitive
forms of language or primitive language” (17). In Philosophical Investigations, we
find that Wittgenstein quoted the conception of “ostensive definitions” which is
characterized by Augustine as a paradigmatic instance of a mistaken view how a
child learns to speak. Wittgenstein thinks that we play with words in our language.
The comparison of language to a game does not suggest that language is something
trivial. Indeed the speaking of language is a part of communal activity, a way of living
in a society that Wittgenstein calls ‘a form of life,’ and something as formalized and
shared. In Wittgenstein’s ‘language game’ hypothesis, A is building with some building
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stones; there are slabs, blocks, pillars, beams etc. A needs them.  For this purpose, the
builder (A) and his assistant (B) use a language consisting of the words ‘slab,’ ‘block,’
‘pillar.’ A calls out and B brings them, which he learnt to bring at such and such a call.
Wittgenstein calls the former kind of language games as ‘pure language games’ and
later kind that includes non-linguistic behaviour as an ‘impure-language game’ (Pitcher
242).
Anthony Kenny thinks that both the purely linguistic behaviour and the behaviour
which are a mixture of linguistic and non-linguistic, can be regarded as the key
conception of Wittgenstein’s “language game.” We may consider the conception of
‘pure language game’ as the original home where we can draw inferences in
calculating, providing a theorem etc. as it has some logical and mathematical
backgrounds. But ‘impure language games’ lie in the background, when words are
used in pure ones. Malcolm suggests, “According to Wittgenstein, an expression has
meaning only in the stream of life” (75).
Why does Wittgenstein consider that language is a game? A game can follow
the distinctive features:
a. Games are designed for playing
b. Games has certain rules of obligations
c. Games are goal-directed
d. The rules of games are arbitrary
e. Games are bound in the sense that it starts and is finished.
We may consider ‘language game’ as something like a game that is played
with words.  There we find a crucial similarity between language and game. Both of
these have some performatory utterances. Wittgenstein’s ‘language game’ gives an
expression of its meaning, which plays an important role in its social network. Actually,
Wittgenstein believes that philosophy is nothing but analysis and discussion of language.
Language is a style of life and the activity of man is a game. Wittgenstein’s theory of
meaning is regarded as “use theory of meaning.” In Philosophical Investigation,
Wittgenstein’s says, “For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we
employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in
the language” (sec. 43).
Wittgenstein believes that the meaning of a sentence or a word lies in its use.
Language game is a kind of picture in which the speaker rules and the contexts are
fully explicit. In language game, we have to follow certain rules. Actually obeying a
rule is a practice; Wittgenstein says, “Following a rule is analogous to obeying an
order. We are trained to do so” (Investigations sec. 206). The concept of rules is
based on grammar, which has a characteristic pattern with ‘form of life.’ But the
rules of grammar are ‘arbitrary.’ Even in our formal language, rules are not well
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designed. This kind of rules also defines what is possible and permitted in the language
game. R. C. Pradhan aptly claims, “If the rules had been designed for a specific
purpose, language would cease to be autonomous and self-contained” (124). For
Wittgenstein ‘private rule following’ is impossible because the rule following depends
on public activity or in a community circle.
Husserl’s Theory of Meaning
For Husserl, Intentionality is considered as the general theme of phenomenology
and the peculiarity of consciousness of something. Phenomenology seems to be a
descriptive science that copes with consciousness. Even the consciousness of the
mind has an intention towards the objects. Husserl considers, “The ‘noema’ is nothing
but a generalization of the idea of meaning (Sinn) to the field of all acts” (Ideas
Pertaining 89). We may find that a ‘noema’ has two components: a. One that has
some objects with certain properties is common to all acts; b. One that has different
characters associated with the different acts.
The ‘noematic’ meaning has a virtue which consciousness relates to the object.
It is an intuitive grasp of an object, which must be an internal object. It seems an ideal
object has no physical or mental structure. One can consider it as an intended object.
Now one may ask “is it a replica of the Platonic idea”? The answer will be something
controversial. Though like Wittgenstein Husserl also makes a distinction between
Meaning and Essence, Husserl finds out the conception of transcendental essences
under phenomenological reduction where he mentions that our mental picture theory
of meaning is not a ‘copy theory of perception.’ He gives importance on the
phenomenological reduction to bracket the real existence of a perceived object.
Besides, ‘noematic meaning’ has an act. Husserl thinks that sameness of Sinn
(meaning) takes place only where the objects remain identically alike. It depends on
same properties etc. His ‘noematic meaning’ is actually the meaning that is not only
attached with the acts but also to linguistic meaning as once Frege claimed. Husserl
also makes a distinction between meaning and reference. In his Logical
Investigations we find that Husserl makes a threefold distinction between subjective
mental content, objective entities, and abstract entities.
Linguistic meanings as an intentional entity are ontologically separated from
the grasp of consciousness. Husserl claims meaning to be an act character, a part of
phenomenological experience, whereas Wittgenstein rejected the appeal of inner
experience. According to Husserl, “The meaning expressed as the Bedeutung of the
words is the meaning, the noematic sinn, of the underlying act. This meaning is what
is communicated from speaker to hearer” (qtd. in Smith and McIntyre, Husserl and
180). Husserl has a general view that the words used in speech act express their
meaning through ‘noematic act’ of consciousness. Actually, the intentional act which
refers to an object is the primary unit of consciousness. Husserl says that the referring
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to the meaning of a sentence is regarded as a reflective act of thinking. The act of
experiencing the object by the mind is called noesis. McIntyre and Smith aptly indicate,
The key to understanding both linguistic and mental representation, then,
is the notion of meaning. Nonetheless, we would emphasize one huge
difference between these two kinds of representations. Linguistic
expressions are representational because of their meanings we face, but a
linguistic expression cannot give meaning to itself ... the representational
or intentional character of language is “derivative”, derivative from the
fact that we conscious beings can give meaning to various sounds and
marks. Thus, the meanings that made linguistic expressions
representational come to them from “outside”. By contrast, Husserl holds,
the representational or intentional character of our mental states comes to
them from the “inside”. The noesis of an act is an intrinsic part of the
(“real”) phenomenological content of that act itself, and the chief role of
the noesis is to give “meaning” to the act. (Theory of 150-151)
There are two different levels in understanding the meaning: (a) Linguistic
level and (b) Phenomenological level. Linguistic level deals with empirical consciousness
of the mind while phenomenological level deals with pure or transcendental
consciousness of mind. The ‘noema’ belongs to the empirical sphere and ‘intuitive
act’ belongs to the realm of pure consciousness, whereas ‘noesis’ is considered as an
actual act of experiencing the object. However, ‘noema’ is a particular method of
experience the object. Therefore ‘noema’ is not a real part of the act.
Mohanty’s Points
In his theory of meaning, the misleading point is “Meanings are ideal entities.”
The conception of making a distinction between ‘meaning’ and ‘reference,’ Husserl
has taken the mentioned thought from Frege, and he extended it beyond linguistic
expressions just through the act of consciousness. Husserl feels that the understanding
of pure phenomenological analysis is possible in terms of the disconnection of the
mind from the objects of the external world. Here his process was to bracket the
objective world to know the conception of selfhood or conscious being. Generally this
process of bracketing and the achieving of selfhood is called the transcendental
phenomenology. Here Husserl’s purpose is to find out the realm of universal
consciousness that leads him to accept the transcendental subjectivity that is beyond
the necessity of objective world. Husserl takes up consciousness as relation. Actually,
it is a relation that means an object by upholding the meaning act. Brentano aims to
distinguish between the physical phenomena and the psychical phenomenon from the
perspective of intentionality. Brentano believes that intentionality is exclusively applicable
to psychical phenomenon. Husserl takes a U-turn from Brentano by initiating the idea
of mental inexistence of an object. For Brentano, the intentional experience denotes
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an appearing object as such (Mohanty, The Possibility 17-20). But Husserl adds that
not only a phenomenon in this sense refers to an appearing object as such, but it also
means certain intentional experiences. As intentional experience points out a range of
fashions to the objects, so we should accept some intentional sense, which is allied to
the presentative experiences. Husserl thinks that the Brentanian idea of the intentional
is affected by the problem of ambiguity. He tries to evade psychical phenomenon and
reinstate the word intentional experience, which specify the characteristic of intention
that always leads towards something objective. Here the important thing is that in
Logical Investigations, Husserl introduces the idea of intentionality as the very
essence of consciousness instead of intentionality as an act of consciousness. As he
allowed the prominent idea of pure ego which cannot be reduced, so the essential
aspect of the sphere of experience would depend on the two noteworthy ideas.
First, every cogito is directed to an object, and secondly, we should accept
necessarily a cogito of this ego. Husserl looks at intentionality as a unique experience.
Though we cannot claim that every experience has some intentionality, the
understanding of the way of intentionality rests on experience. In the case of everyday
experience, the directness towards corelated objects may not be available. Here, the
conception of intentionality remains concealed. Basically, Husserl avoids the term
physical phenomenon to facilitate the term ‘experience’ in the sense of intentional
experience. Here intention obviously indicates the reference of something objective.
Husserl also thinks that expression and intention is an act, i.e. aiming at something.
Mohanty quoted from Husserl,
The location “intentional experience referring to an object” should not be
construed as meaning that two things are present in experiences, an object
and an intentional act directed towards it. Only one thing is present, an
intentional experience, and “if this experience is present, then eo ipso and
through its own essence (we must insist), the intentional ‘relation’ to an
object is achieved, and an object is ‘intentionally presented’.”
(Intentionality 71)
In Logical Investigations, we find that though Husserl thinks meaning and
species do not coincide, yet he believes in “meaning as species.” Mohanty says that
the conception of “Meaning are ideal entities” are coming from the other conception
of ideal entities which is regarded as ‘essences.’ He also thinks that there is a sharp
distinction between the meaning of √4  and the essence or number 2. Even the
concept of essence is an ontological concept while meaning is an epistemological
concept, which is also regarded as a medium of reference. Therefore, we may consider
essences as entities, but not meaning as such. Now one may ask, “Are all Husserlian
essences meaning”? Mohanty refutes this thinking to say, “They all are certainly
objects of possible reference. Just as one and the same real thing may be referred to
Wittgenstein and Husserl 108
GU
JP
Vo
l.1
, N
o.1
through different meanings. So one and the same essence (the number 2, for example)
may be referred through the different meanings (for example, the meanings of ‘√4 ’
and 3√8 )” (On Husserl’s 230).
Mohanty also claims that Husserl’s meaning theory is not a linguistic theory; it
is actually a speech act. Derrida’s points seem to be a powerful criticism of Husserl’s
theory of meaning. Mohanty thinks that Derrida is mainly trying to attack on the
metaphysical presuppositions of Husserl’s phenomenology to show that it is based on
a separation of expression from the indicative sign. For Husserl an expression is an
indication in communicative speech. However, he turns away from communicative
speech to solitary monologue where we will not find any indicative function of our
ascribing expressions as Derrida claimed against Husserl. Because speaker’s inner
mental states are something his/her own. Here Derrida finds a kind of ‘reduction’
from the physical event to inner speech. But Mohanty criticizes Derrida’s thinking to
suggest that in solitary monologue speech refers to the world. Therefore, Derrida
makes a mistake to think that Husserl’s idea of indicative function covers all that falls
subject to the reductions, factuality, and world of existence etc. Now Mohanty opposes,
“Husserl’s general theory of the ideality of meaning, then, does not need his reduction
of speech to “inner monologue.” On the contrary, it would seem to need “sharability”
and “communicability”” (On Husserl’s 241). Derrida points out that there is an
unfailing complicity submerged between the idealization and speech. He says, “ideality
of the object needs that the consciousness of it should be non-empirical” (75-76).
Mohanty’s response to Derrida sounds to me more intriguing as he says,
There also Turks in this argument of Derrida’s deep misunderstanding of
what the relation is between empirical and transcendental consciousness
in Husserl’s Philosophy—a relation, a ‘Parallelism’, which Husserl often
characterized as the wonder of all wonders. (On Husserl’s 244)
Concluding Remarks
Both Husserl and Wittgenstein make a distinction between ‘meaning’ and
‘essence.’ Wittgenstein thinks that ‘essence’ is the result of language going on holiday.
Essence is expressed by grammar, which is related to the family resemblance. Husserl,
an opponent constructed the idea of transcendental essence under phenomenological
reduction. Our mental picture theory of meaning is not ‘copy theory of perception.’
Actually, Husserl’s aim is to bring the conception of phenomenological reduction to
bracket the real existence of perceived objects. Husserl seems to argue that there is
a ‘naivety’ that we may find in Wittgenstein’s theory of language. Wittgenstein pre-
supposed the conception of language, thought and reality in his meaning theory without
making any inquiry of their own foundation. We need to search for foundation
otherwise; our philosophy will mislay its ground. Husserl and Wittgenstein both believe
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in the description attitude of language. But Husserl’s conception of description arises
from phenomenological ground that reduced level of ordinary language, while
Wittgenstein portrayed it through the ordinary language level. We can find a keen
distinction between Husserl’s and Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning here. In the
Tractatus Wittgenstein writes that a picture may be true or false from the perspective
of reality. Husserl quietly supports this thinking. His intentionality theory says that the
‘noematic’ meaning relates to the object through the consciousness. So here an intuitive
grasp of the internal object is relevant than the perceived objects. Ayer aptly points
out, “Wittgenstein’s well known dictum an “inner process’ stands in need of outward
criteria is pedagogically true” (77). For Wittgenstein meaning is not something like an
internal phenomenon. To him meaning is considered as a considerable communal
embedding. For Husserl, every real object is ‘bracketed’ by the phenomenological
reduction. Every intentional experience has its intentional object that is relied on its
objective meaning. Husserl’s thought promulgates that the mindless world cannot be
possible, but world less mind exists. Because Husserl believes that though intentionality
is a fundamental feature of consciousness, but that does not confirm that the intentional
object really exists, as the existent of the external world is accidental for Husserl.
Husserl intends to emphasize a difference between conceiving of the subject as an
object in the world and conceiving of the subject as a subject in the world. Zahavi
puts Husserl’s thought in this way that seems more stimulating,
Husserl’s formulations and terminology are not always transparently clear,
but I think the central idea that eventually crystallizes is something like the
following: Husserl consistently claims that reality can only appear thanks
to subjectivity. But eventually he came to the realization that the subject
does not remain untouched by its constitutive performance, but is, on the
contrary, drawn into it, just as constitution is not simply a relation involving
a singular subject and the world, but rather something that must be
considered as inter subjective process. (363)
Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning takes a clear shortcut to externalism to say
that there is nothing like private rule following. The thinking is that without any social
sanction the conception of the ‘use of language’ will be unfeasible. However, Husserl’s
transcendental phenomenology is close to internalist view. Husserl believes in eidetic
reduction from fact to essence and then a reduction of the object facts to the unities
of meaning given in the subjective experience. Actually, intentionality has been
understood by Husserl as the unique characteristic of experience to be consciousness
of something. The phenomena, which are presented to consciousness is regarded as
apodictically self-given reality. The idea of an object (noema) is intuitively grasped by
the cogitation that must be related to the internal object.
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